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“EU incoherence and inconsistency
over Libya”: evidence to the
contrary
Stelios Stavridis
1 Following a similar pattern to other examples of what became to be known as the “Arab
Spring”, the conflict in Libya in 2011 also began with the arrest of civil rights activists
which  quickly  led  to  full-scale  protests  eventually  developing  into  a  civil  war.1 In
response, the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) adopted two Resolutions
(Nos. 1970 and 1973, respectively on 26 February 2011 and 17 March 2011); the former
imposed economic sanctions and an arms embargo, whereas the latter authorized “to
take all necessary means to protect civil population” –although specifically “excluding
a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory”, but including
the possibility of a limited air intervention.2 Military action was spearheaded by the
USA,  Britain and France,  before it  continued under NATO military control,  and the
participation of 18 states in total. At the end of the summer, the Gaddafi regime was
collapsing and the military conflict came to an end in October 2011 when the “rebels”
captured and killed him.
2 Germany abstained on Resolution No. 1973,3 which fuelled claims of European Union
(EU) disunity from the very beginning. Indeed, the existing literature about how EU
institutions and member states reacted to the violence in Libya in 2011 maintains that,
contrary to other actors, the EU was fundamentally divided, incoherent and inefficient.
For instance, Nicole Koenig clearly states that:
Despite a rocky start and some criticism along the way, the ultimate success of
NATO’s intervention has provided for a rather positive record after all. The same
cannot be said for the European Union. The EU’s reaction was criticized for being too slow,
too weak, too divided and essentially incoherent. Some have already mourned the death
of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): ‘‘The CFSP died over
Libya – we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it”.4
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3 Sergio Fabbrini argues that Libya was the “first  foreign-security test  for the Lisbon
Treaty […]. The test was not satisfactory. […T]he EU as a collective actor did come out
from the Libyan crisis divided and weak as usual”.5
4 This  article  qualifies  substantially those  criticisms  by  providing  evidence  to  the
contrary. In the first part, it does two things: by using the “time factor”, it asserts that
first impressions are often misleading, and that most criticisms based on earlier studies
had been published even before the fall of Gaddafi or very soon afterwards, thus not
allowing for the benefit of hindsight; moreover, by only focusing on a few years before
the  2011  conflict,  most  of  them  were  taking  a  “selective  memory”  approach,
“conveniently”  forgetting  about  the  role  of  Libya  as  a  “pariah  state”  in  the
international  community.  Then,  the article  substantiates with evidence how the EU
reaction was much more coherent and consistent than suggested. It also points out that
at the end of the day, even Italy (special relationship with Gaddafi) participated in the
bombing and eventually Germany (abstention at the UN) closed ranks. In Part 2, this
study also adds further data by presenting the impact of one of the most long-standing
anti-Gaddafi  institutions:  that of the European Parliament which spurred the Union
into promoting a practical implementation of the concept of Responsibility to Protect
(R2P).6 It is the longest part in this study as it is also its major originality. In Part 3, the
article  also  criticizes  the  rather  unrealistic  views  taken  by  many  an  observer  –in
particular  those  who  presume  of  the  existence  of  European  and  International
Governance systems that simply do not reflect reality. 
5 However neither does this piece take a triumphalist view as the one adopted by two top
NATO officials in their article entitled “NATO’s Triumph in Libya”7: “By any measure,
NATO  succeeded  in  Libya.  It  saved tens  of  thousands  of  lives  from  almost  certain
destruction and enabled the Libyan opposition to overthrow one of the world’s longest-
ruling  dictator.”  Or  in  a  similar  line,  speaking  at  the  5 April  2011  EP  Plenary,  “EU
Council  President  Herman  van  Rompuy  has  even  suggested  the  EU  take  credit  for
helping to  prevent  a  bloodbath in Libya”.8 A  point  he reiterated in May 2012:  “We
surprised everyone”.9
6 There is another set of factors that would also strengthen this study, namely the nature
and the context of the conflict  itself.  That means that,  very often, in inter-state or
intra-state conflicts,  there is  no easy answer.  “Second best” solutions are often the
result  of  so  many different  internal  and external  factors  that  to  wish  for  an  ideal
solution is a vain exercise. To use this “ideal” as a benchmark is also often a mistake.
Events  and  decisions  evolve  in  various  and  complex  ways.  Hesitation  is  part  of
International  relations.  These  factors  are  often  included  in  analyzing  state  or
institutional reactions to international conflicts. For instance, Sergio Fabbrini correctly
notes that the Obama administration hesitated before getting involved and this time
only by “leading from behind”.10 It seems that such allowance was not given to the EU
in most of the existing literature. This factor will not be analyzed here for reasons of
space. Nor will this study consider or draw any general conclusions about the wider
implications of Libya for EU security and other policies towards the Mediterranean, as
this would meant a totally different perspective to the one taken here. 
7 Thus,  the  conclusions  of  this  article  are  that  initial  harsh  criticisms  should  be
substantially qualified, especially if one takes into account the learning curve that EU
foreign policy appears to show, especially when its reaction to Libya is compared to
those of the Balkans in the 1990s or to the Iraq War in 2003.
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Rebutting the selective use of the “time factor” and
the “under estimation” of the EU reaction
The time factor
8 The  works  by  Koenig  have  been  consistently  and  systematically  referred  in  most
studies that followed.11 All appeared to coincide with her blunt criticism as mentioned
above.12
9 Juan Garrigues even argued that “[a]side from providing vital cargoes of humanitarian
aid, the EU has remained on the sidelines of the conflict”.13 Or as Echagüe, Michou,
Mikail put it: “[…] imposing sanctions, freezing assets and delivering humanitarian aid
cannot entirely detract from disunity between member states”.14 Others claimed that
”Europe’s  defence experts  considered that  the Libyan crisis  constituted ‘a  textbook
example of  a  situation in which Europe,  through the European Union,  should have
taken  the  lead’  in  the  military  operation”.15 Devuyst  even  asserted  that  “European
disunity showed itself in the most tragic manner when the European Council failed to
craft a meaningful common approach towards the revolt against the regime of Colonel
Gaddafi in Libya”.16 Some go even as far as to claim that all EU institutions and member
states were Gaddafi’s supporters,17 and they did very little to remove him from power,
even when the conflict began within Libya in early 2011. 
10 There are a number of qualifications of the above that render it rather unsubstantiated.
First, it is unfair to keep on quoting Koenig’s work as if it were the only one available in
the literature. It is somehow preoccupying that most subsequent works rarely bothered
to look into long-established or more recent studies showing how “problematic” the
Gaddafi regime had been since it began in 1969. Is it enough to quote Koenig’s work, but
not question it? Especially when, as shown below, les faits sont têtus!
11 One key criticism of  the  claims of  “double  standards”  and support  for  the  Gaddafi
regime  concerns  analyses  that  limited  themselves  to  the  last  decade  prior  to  the
conflict in 2011 (once the UN sanctions over Lockerbie had been finalized is to ignore
recent history). To focus on the more “friendly” relations does not mean that they were
that  friendly,  nor  for  all  the  time.  Selective  memory  tends  to  lead  to  unfair
assessments.
12 Indeed, historical evidence shows beyond any doubt that the Libyan regime had always
been a problematic country for the West in general and Europe in particular ever since
the military coup that led to Gaddafi’s coming to power in 1969. In the words of Joffé
and Paoletti,18 the Gaddafi regime in Libya represented “the archetypal pariah state”.19
13 Facts confirm it plenty: be it as a supporter of Anti-Colonialism mainly through its pro-
Soviet Union alliance during the Cold War, via Pan-Arabism or Pan-Africanism,20 even
Pan-Islamism, and supporting actively international terrorism, be it the IRA or its own
home made brand (1986 UTA and 1988 Pan Am Lockerbie bombings). Lockerbie led to
1992  UN  sanctions  (initial  refusal  to  hand  over  two  suspects)  which  were  only
suspended in 1999 when Libya handed them over for trial in The Netherlands.21
14 In December 2003 (some have argued because Gaddafi got scared by the US invasion of
Iraq), Libya announced that it was giving up its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
programme  (in  the  past,  Libya  had  used  chemical  weapons  in  Chad).  The  use  of
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chemical weapons in Syria in 2013 confirms that it is better for non-democratic regimes
not to possess those types of weapons at all. Seen as yet another gesture of good will for
re-entering  the  international  order  then,  Italy  pressured  the  EU  for  improving
relations.22 The  additional  fact  that  in  2004  there  was  a  sudden influx  of  irregular
immigrants towards the island of Lampedusa also played an important role in trying to
improve  relations  between  the  Europeans  and  Gaddafi.
23 A policy card that Gaddafi used again in 2011 24– hence the reluctance by this author
to “just” see it as another coincidence after the 2004 precedent and put all the blame on
the French or on the Italians for not agreeing on how to interpret Schengen rules on
that particular case.  This was yet another refugee-cum-migration crisis  that Libya’s
dictatorial regime had provoked intentionally in its efforts to keep power.
15 Still  on the “rapprochement” with Libya,  and although Libya had been invited and
attended Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) meetings, it had refused to formally
join  the  Barcelona  Process  as  it  considered  it  could  not  accept  its  political  acquis:
commitment to human rights and democratic principles. Of course, other authoritarian
and dictatorial regimes belong to the Barcelona Process but, at least they had formally
declared their adherence to the EMP’s values, principles and rules, even if they did not
obey by them. This is  not rare in international relations.  All  193 states that belong
today to the UN are supposed to respect the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights. But many of them do not follow those principles in practice. Gaddafi
also refused to join the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008 on the grounds that
it  was  “an  insult  to  us  Arabs  and  Africans”.  In  short,  Gaddafi  claimed  that  the
Europeans were “taking us for fools. […] We do not belong to Brussels”.25
16 Once the EMP was transformed into the UfM, the European Commission engaged in a
number of new bilateral agreements with the Southern Mediterranean states, and it did
so  also  with  Libya,  starting  in  late  2010.  EU-Libya  negotiations  for  a  Framework
Agreement where progressing,26 when the “Arab Spring” brought them to a sudden
end. The EU-Libya Migration Cooperation Agenda that had been signed on 5 October
2010  by Commissioners  Mälstrom and Füle  and the  Libyan authorities  an  EU-Libya
Migration Cooperation Agenda was therefore suspended on 22 February 2011. 
 
The EU reaction
17 As the violence continued and began to spread in Libya, the EU’s reaction led to calls
for intervention, in line with the two UN resolutions, once Gaddafi announced in words
and in actions his willingness to stop popular revolts by a bloodbath.27 The EU also
participated in the March 2011 London Conference on Libya that worked on how to
implement those UN resolutions.28
18 The EU reaction was quite extensive29: there were several declarations by the various EU
personalities  and  institutions  condemning  what  was  happening  in  Libya30;  there
followed calls for Gaddafi to relinquish power, and finally recognition and support for
the “rebels”31 (with the opening of  a  liaison office  in Benghazi  with the Transition
National Council on 22 May). In terms of actions, there was emergency humanitarian
assistance  provided by  the  EU,32 as  well  as  the  activation of  FRONTEX to  Italy  and
Greece.33
19 Most importantly, the EU adopted sanctions, including some that went well beyond UN
requests.  For  instance,  additional  restrictive  measures,  finances  and  movement  of
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persons were taken on 28 February 2011. The EUFOR Libya, a military operation (to
support  humanitarian assistance  operations)  was  prepared but  not  implemented as
there was no UN call for such use and some EU “battle groups” member states (Sweden)
were not willing to act.34
20 At the fall of regime, in late August, the EU participated in the 1 September 2011 Paris
Conference in Support of the New Libya (60 countries, UN, etc.) which approved the
unfreezing of Libyan assets in order to help reconstruction of Libya. No doubt, the most
important contribution was that many EU states actively or indirectly participated in
the forceful removal of the Gaddafi regime.
21 The EU reaction, and especially from the European Commission, continued after the
end of the military conflict: it includes the new SPRING/Support to Partnership, Reform
and Inclusive Growth programme, with an extra 350 million euros for 2011-2013; plus a
new Civil  Society Facility (22 million for 2011-2013);  and a new set  of  new bilateral
agreements (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with Agreements on Conformity
Assessment and Acceptance).35 This results from the bi-annual European Neighbourhood
and Partnership Instrument Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for Libya. In
late November 2013,  the European Commission announced another 15 million euros
support package.36
22 In addition, the EU participated in election monitoring of the July 2012 parliamentary
elections,37 as  well as  having  deployed  since  May 2013,  over  two years  and with  a
30 million  annual  budget,  the  European Union  Integrated  Border  Management
Assistance Mission (EUBAM) helping the Libyans protect their land, sea and air borders.
38
23 As a result of the empirical evidence presented above, it is possible to dismiss Koenig’s
claim  of  “horizontal  incoherence”  between  various  EU  crisis  management  actors
(Commission, Council, etc.). Indeed, she ignores all of the means that were deployed as
described  above.  There  was  no  fundamental  contradiction  in  the  means  used.  It  is
another thing to claim that they were not sufficient: for instance MEP Ana Gomes, the
EP rapporteur on Libya, agrees that the EU only made available 30 million euros over
six months for the Libyans whereas the EU had provided ten times more to Kosovo for
instance.39
24 On  the  “discrepancy”  between  van  Rompuy  and  Ashton  (the  former  mentioning
“regime change” and the latter contradicting him), it is overblown: it is often part of
the diplomatic game to “blow hot and cold air” during a conflict. It is also important to
note  that  the  EU  wanted  to  keep  not  only  the  Arab  states  on  board  but  more
importantly Russia and China (see the current stalemate over Syria with Russia and
China exercising their veto right). As for the “teething” problems with the European
External Action Service/EEAS (seen as being “sidelined”), one must bear in mind that it
had only been activated a few weeks before (December 2010/January 2011).
25 Such a claim over the EU reaction in Libya in 2011 also fails to consider the peculiarities
of  each  conflict,  and,  more  importantly,  does  not  take  into  account  the  “learning
curve” that European cooperation in foreign, security and defence policies entails over
time. Finally, there is another crucial question that had to be answered in practice and
not only in theory: how was it possible to stop the bloodshed in Libya without removing
Gaddafi?  This  is  a  key issue that  those critical  of  R2P in Libya conveniently  fail  to
address.40
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26 Thus, as was shown above, the rather more efficient and united EU stance over Libya
should indeed be contrasted to previous, less successful,  attempts at coherence and
cohesion.  Therefore  the  “time  factor”,  both  prior  to  and  after  2011,  has  strongly
qualified  the  claims  of  EU  inconsistency  and  inefficiency.  This  case  was  further
strengthened  by  looking  at  what  actually  the  EU  had  done  as  an  entity.  Another
qualification has to do with other actors (especially one EU institution in particular)
and follows in the next section. 
27 On EU institutions, Koenig also criticizes what she calls “vertical incoherence” which
deals with EU member states and their relation to the EU institutions. This is again
unfair because by focusing on the French, German, and Italian national policies as so
many  critics  do  (see  above):  it  is  simply  unreasonable  to  blame  the  EU  for  the
reluctance to act shown by some of its member states. Such a claim would imply that
there already existed a fully Europeanized common foreign policy, which is simply not
true. In fact, considering that Italy fought the war, and that Germany eventually joined
the EU stance;  in particular “Germany sent 300 personnel  to man AWACS flights in
Afghanistan to free up NATO forces for the Libya no fly zone operation.”41
28 Also whether the EU as a whole or only some of its leading member states acted, it is
important  to  note  that  a  (worse)  massacre  was  avoided  in  Libya.  The  criterion  of
success is more important than that of who actually acted. Moreover, this “efficiency”
should  be  contrasted  to  the  slowness  in  responding  twenty  years  earlier  to  the
Yugoslav wars, or for that matter over Iraq in 2002-2003. For instance, Socialist MEP
Ana  Gomes  said  that  “Sarkozy  should  be  given  credit  for  stopping  a  massacre  in
Benghazi.”42
29 In the case of Italy,43 the August 2008 Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation
with Libya which included a non-aggression clause (Article 3)44 was ratified in March
2009 by its Parliament.45 This is the “same” Parliament that in March 2011 approved
Italy’s participation in the war (even if with only a small majority in favour) when the
situation  in  Libya  became  unsustainable  from  a  human  rights  perspective.  As  for
France, it is too simplistic to criticize its stance on Libya and ignore other foreign policy
initiatives in other parts of the world, be it in Africa, the Balkans, or Asia.
30 And at the end of the day both countries fought against the Gaddafi regime. If this is no
evidence of not being his supporters, then one must wonder what would constitute
such evidence indeed. If one argues that interests had changed over time, this is rather
simplistic  and  ignores  the  difference  between  what  is  desirable  and  feasible  in
international affairs: or does it imply that Europe should have bombed Gaddafi earlier?
What about all those (including in Europe) who had opposed the 1986 US bombing? The
key factor in 2011 was Gaddafi’s decision to respond violently to peaceful protesters
treating them as “rats”.46
31 As for her final point, Koenig about “multilateral incoherence” between the EU’s crisis
response and those of the UN, NATO and the African Union, this is where Koenig is at
her weakest: how can one blame EU incoherence for any lack of coherence within other
organizations,  or  ones  with  different  members,  even  with  sometimes  overlapping
memberships?  For  instance,  on  NATO,  it  is  Turkish  intransigence  (and  some  EU
member states tolerance of course) over Cyprus that does not allow for the EU-NATO
Berlin Plus cooperation agreement to function: and Turkey does not belong to the EU.
As for the AU and the Arab League, the first had as President in Office the leader of…
Libya! Again, how would the EU have altered such a situation with internal coherence
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or not? The Arab League is famous for its lack of influence due to its divisions over most
international issues, including those affecting Arab states.
 
The European parliament and how it strengthened and
legitimized the EU’s response on Libya through R2P
32 It is relevant to recall that some observers, including Koenig herself,47 had identified
the EP as particularly active and coherent over Libya –but without developing the point
further. Moreover, taking this into consideration did not alter at all their otherwise
critical analysis. As Jose Magone notes: 
The European Parliament has been a vehement supporter of the pro-democracy
movement. Such support has been characterised by cross-party support. Military
intervention was regarded by Members of the EP as a legitimate action, if civilian
lives are at stake.48
33 Therefore,  there  seems  to  be  consensus  among  the  existing  limited  literature  that
either refers comprehensively or in passing to the EP’s role in Libya.49 Such an
approach qualifies substantially the claim that the EU did not act in a coherent way
over Libya by adding more data to the evidence presented above. What follows offers a
detailed account of why this was the case in the EP.
34 Most parliamentarians consider the growth of parliamentary diplomacy as part of their
“daily life”.50 Interest is also slowly emerging in the academic literature,51 with special
attention given to the European Parliament.
35 It is important52 to note that, even prior to the conflict in Libya, the EP was the most
critical  of  the three main EU institutions.  A stance it  further developed during the
conflict, acting as a “moral spur” –in particular over R2P implementation– to all actors
involved, be they at the levels of the national EU member states, of the EU, or of the
global system. Thus legitimizing and democratizing its impact even further.
36 Before the conflict, due, as noted above, to the European re-engagement with Libya
following  the  2000  UN sanctions  lifting,  a  number  of  inter-parliamentary  meetings
between the EP Delegation for relations with Maghreb countries and the Arab Maghreb
Union had occurred in 2002, 2004 and 2005.53 It is important to repeat that even when it
stressed the need for dialogue, the EP did not spare any criticisms. Thus, in one of its
resolutions54 adopted on 17 June 2010 55, the EP declared that:
the main obstacle in the relations between the EU and Libya is the lack of progress
in the dialogue on human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, […], as well
as the Libyan regime’s aggressive external policy, not least towards European states.
37 During the November 2010 Fourth inter-parliamentary meeting of the EP Delegation
for relations with the Maghreb countries with the Libyan authorities, the Report by
Italian  Socialist  MEP  Pier  Antoni  Panzeri  showed  optimism  about  possible
improvements in relations, but, at the same time expressed caution about what the
Libyans  declare  and  what  they  actually  do.  In  particular,  it  warned  about  serious
difficulties in EP-Libyan relations due to the fact that there is no real parliament in
Libya. In Gaddafi’s own words:
Parliament is a misrepresentation of the people, and parliamentary systems are a
false solution to the problem of democracy.
38 The subsequent December 2010 EP Foreign Affairs Committee Report56 refers to the
above but also welcomes negotiations and encourages EU efforts to try and bring Libya
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under  the  UfM.  Yet,  again,  its  Rapporteur,  Portuguese  Socialist  MEP  Ana  Gomes,
qualifies Gaddafi as the longest serving dictator.
39 On 20 January 2011, in a recommendation proposal, the EP “welcomed” the opening of
negotiations  with  Libya.57 That  is  to  say  just  one  month  before  suspension  of  all
agreements or negotiations. Again, this does not mean that the EP had given up its
criticisms:  simply that it  was supporting the EU’s engagement with non-democratic
regimes as the EU does with so many of them in an effort to alter their nature and
behaviour.
40 At  the  start  of  the  conflict  in  2011,  the  EP  President,  Jerzy  Buzek,  stated  the
institution’s position very clearly and unambiguously:
On behalf of the European Parliament, I urge the authorities in Libya to halt all
violence against the demonstrators. […] Those who carry out atrocities must know
that they will be brought to justice and that they are responsible for their actions
before  the  Libyan  people.  […]  We,  the  elected  representatives  of  the  European
people,  will  defend  this  dignity  wherever  we  can.  It  is  our  responsibility  as
parliamentarians to stand by the people who, regardless of the price, are fighting for their
fundamental freedoms.58
41 On 2 March 2011, following the extraordinary Conference of Presidents (Leaders of EP
political groups) with High Representative Catherine Ashton on the EU reaction to the
events in Libya and elsewhere in the Mediterranean, the EP President stated: 
Europe has a historic duty today to support the people in their fight for freedom
and democracy against authoritarianism, repression and human rights violation.
[…] We have reached the point of no return: Colonel Gaddafi’s time is over. The
European Parliament has always been a strong advocate of an EU foreign policy
based on values rather than interests. Our stance has often been overlooked as not
being realist enough. Today, the people are proving the cynics wrong.59
42 Two days later, during an EP (European Parliament) Plenary, “MEPs brand[ed] Gaddafi
a criminal, [and] demand[ed a] no-fly zone over Libya”.60 The MEPs urged also Lady
Ashton to  recognize  the  rebel  Council  as  the  official  representatives  of  the  Libyan
people and call for Gaddafi to step down immediately.61
43 In addition to the above role as a moral tribune, the EP also included a direct reference
to R2P in an overwhelmingly consensual manner. All initial proposals submitted by the
various political groups were eventually merged into a single motion for resolution.62
This is important in countering the argument of lack of unity as MEPs supporting that
particular resolution and the overall EP stance include Germans, Italians, etc.
44 The  9 March  2011  resolution,  passed  with  584 votes  in  favour,  18 against,  and
18 abstentions, stressed: 
that the EU and its member states must honour their Responsibility to Protect, in
order to save Libyan civilians from large-scale armed attacks; points out that no
option provided for in the UN Charter can therefore be ruled out; calls on the High
Representative  and  the  Member  States  to  stand  ready  for a  UNSC  decision  on
further measures, including the possibility of a no-fly zone aimed at preventing the
regime from targeting the civilian population.63
45 The  EP  organized  various  events  and  produced  a  range  of  reports  over  the  years,
including  ones  specifically  geared  to  discuss  R2P  as  a  concept.64 Its  February  2012
resolution on the UN’s Human Rights Council states that: “the concept of Responsibility
to Protect (R2P) has made good progress in UN bodies such as the UNSC, the UNGA, and
the UNHRC”.65 Several later documents have continued to develop this EP stance on
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R2P. For instance, the March 2013 draft Committee on Foreign Affairs report,66 where
German Green MEP Franziska Katharina Brantner calls for the setting up of “an inter-
institutional working group charged with preparing the basis for an inter-institutional
‘Consensus on R2P’ to be adopted jointly by the Council, the EEAS, the Commission and
the European Parliament”. The report also calls, among other recommendations, for
cooperation with “concerned interest groups and civil society actors with the goal of
integrating the proposals for initiatives and improvements into the ‘Consensus on R2P’
document”. 
46 Going back to the fighting in Libya in 2011, the EP and a number of MEPs, in particular
the EP President, also took several other specific practical actions: declarations, visits,
recognitions of rebels, etc. For instance, during an official visit to Tunis by EP President
Jerzy Buzek to Tunis where he stated that:
I am glad and relieved that the international community has finally taken concrete
action  to  stop  Gaddafi  killing  his  own  people.  The  European  Parliament  has
explicitly backed the possibility of a no-fly zone in its resolution of last Thursday. In
the  coming  days,  I  will  discuss  with  leaders  from  Tunisia,  Egypt  and  the  Arab
League how the resolution of the Security Council can be implemented.67
47 There were two visits to Tunisia which included visits to its border with Libya (refugee
camps68) in the six months following the collapse of the Ben Ali regime. For instance,
the  second  visit  included  MEPs  from  Malta,  Britain,  The  Netherlands,  Spain,  and
France.69
48 The EP also “applauded” EU recognition of rebels, and the opening of an EU office in
Benghazi.70 In  July  2011,  Libya’s  National  Transition  Council  delegation  headed  by
Mahmoud Jibril  attended an EP Foreign Affairs Committee meeting.71 Finally,  Buzek
visited Libya in October 2011.
49 The EP also paid special attention to “rape as a weapon of war”: over the alleged gang-
rape of  Ms Eman al  Obeidy,  a  letter  signed by three  female  MEPs (in  their  official
capacities Ana Gomes (S&D, PT) as rapporteur EU-Libya framework agreement, Eva-
Britt Svensson (GUE-NGL, SE) as Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Committee Chair,
Heidi Hautala (Greens/EFA, FI), as Human Rights Sub-Committee Chair) was sent as a
formal request to Lady Hashton for her to act.72
50 In September 2011, in response to the fall of Gaddafi, a joint resolution by the five main
political  groups  welcomed  the  collapse  of  the  former  regime,  called  for  European
support for the transition process, backed explicitly the interim authority of the Libyan
National  Transitional  Council  (NTC)  and  asked  for  no  impunity  for  crimes  against
humanity.73
51 In the post-conflict stage,74 as this country’s situation has yet to stabilize,  with still
numerous serious external and internal security threats, MEPs continued to show their
preoccupation  over  Libya,  even  though  in  comparison  to  2011,  such  attention  has
inevitably decreased. 
52 To support Libya’s post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation, the EU organized in
November-December  2012  a  five-week  Induction  Programme  for  the  inexperienced
newly elected Libyan members of parliament (included in the EU Public Administration
Facility for Libya). Training courses on the functions of a parliament and constitution
drafting  were  taught  by  top-level  EU  and  member  states’  experts,  officials  and
politicians, among others.75 The EP was associated to it, but has not launched so far any
similar initiative on its own. The lack of a tradition of elections or political parties in
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this  country  leaves  a  vast  room  for  assistance  and  cooperation  in  the  field  of
institution-building, where the parliamentary input can be extremely valuable.76 
53 Election monitoring is seen as a key dimension to post-conflict peace-building. In that
particular  area,  the  EP’s  involvement  has  increased  notably  in  recent  years.  It  is
nowadays  engaged  in  this  field  globally,  whether  contributing  to  Organization  for
Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe  (OSCE)/ODIHR77 International  Election
Observation Missions (IEOMs)  in  OSCE member countries,  or  as  part  of  EU Election
Observation Mission (EU EOMs), in the rest of the world.
54 In the 7 July 2012 Libyan general election, the EU was the most important donor to its
organization,  but  did  not  deploy  a  full-scale  EU  EOM.  Instead,  after  receiving  an
invitation from the Libyan High National  Election Commission (HNEC),  the national
independent body tasked with preparing and monitoring the elections –a mandatory
requirement–, it decided to dispatch an EU EAT on 8 June 2012 78. The main difference
between these two modalities is that EU EOMs involve both long-term and short-term
observers and cover the entire electoral process comprehensively (from six to eight
weeks before election day),  while the time frame of EU EATs is  much more limited
(around two weeks, including election day)79.
55 The Libya EU EAT was headed by MEP Alexander Graf  Lambsdorff  and consisted of
7 core  team members  and  14 regional  experts  from 19 different  EU member  states.
Funded by the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, it was formally
independent from the new EU Delegation in Libya, the Commission and the EU member
states. The main criteria for assessing the quality of the electoral process include the
degree of  freedom of  political  parties  and candidates,  of  impartiality  shown by the
election administration, respect for universal franchise, access to media, conduct and
counting of  polling, as well  as other related issues to the democratic nature of  the
election.80
56 To this aim, the EU EAT had contacts with the Libyan HNEC and a broad range of actors
including political parties, civil society organizations, media, national and international
observers  and  members  of  the  international  community.81 The  supportive  message
conveyed by Lambsdorff both before and after the ballot emphasized the extraordinary
relevance of this event:
57 This election is the first opportunity for Libyans to choose their representatives […]
after decades. It marks a historic step for the Country and its people […]. [It] is crucial
for the future of the country.82
58 The preliminary  EU EAT statement  issued two days  after  the  elections  praised  the
efficient, pluralistic and overall peaceful development of the election. It also stressed
the “festive atmosphere” of the election day.83 The ensuing ballot counting operations
were described as “transparent” and “exemplary”.84
59 The  final  report  published  three  months  later,  in  October,  added  some  detailed
“constructive”  recommendations  for  future  electoral  processes,  focusing on aspects
such  as  the  constitutional  and  legal  framework,  election  administration,  voter
registration,  registration of  political  entities  and candidates,  voter  information and
civic education, media, human rights and participation of women, and complaints and
appeals.85
60 The EP’s emphasis was put on the NTC’s responsibility and need to immediately launch
a vast process of institution-building and inclusive democratization.86 It called for EU
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support to focus mainly on two areas: economic-financial facilitation, in compliance
with the promises made in the ‘Friends of Libya’ international summit held in Paris on
1 September  2011  (release  of  frozen  Libyan  assets  and  lifting  of  sanctions),  and
assistance to the reform of the Libyan security sector.87
61 This resolution mentioned reconciliation, highlighting the necessity that the process be
launched  by  the  NTC  and  managed  by the  Libyans themselves,  and  includes
investigation of all human rights violations. The suggested EU contribution consisted in
sending experts and trainers on mediation and dialogue to help the Libyan actors. No
specific role for the EP or MEPs was proposed at that moment.88
62 A November 2012 resolution on the migratory problems connected to Libya, expressed
concern  about  “the  particularly  vulnerable  security  and  human  rights  situation  of
foreigners currently in Libya, especially those coming from sub-Saharan and Eastern
Africa in search of work or political asylum and those still in prison”, as well as “the
living conditions and treatment of migrant detainees in detention centres”.89
63 Still during the post-conflict period, two top-level representatives of the new Libyan
authorities were invited to meetings of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The first of
them, two months before the July 2012 elections, was Mustafa Abushagur, the Deputy
Prime Minister of Abdurrahim el Keib’s interim government.90 One year later, it was the
turn of the first democratically elected Libyan Prime Minister, Ali Zeidan.91
64 The  number  of  EP  President’s  statements  on  Libya  in  2012-2013  also  decreased
substantially compared to the previous year, when the then holder of this position,
Jerzy Buzek, spoke officially up to ten times about the North African country. In the
post-conflict  stage,  President  Martin  Schulz  “congratulate[d]  the  Libyan  people  for
their remarkable democratic performance” in the elections to the GNC, which had set
“a  milestone  in  Libya’s  democratisation  process”.  Referring  explicitly  to  the  EP’s
potential  support  for  the  Libyan  transition,  he  added  that  this  institution  “[stood]
ready to engage and cooperate fully with the newly elected members of the Libyan
General  National  Congress  both  bilaterally  and  in  multilateral  fora  like  the
Parliamentary  Assembly  of  the  Union  for  the  Mediterranean”.92 Later  on,  he  also
condemned the terrorist attack against the U.S. consulate in Benghazi in September
2012.93
 
Whishful thinking does not reflect reality
65 It is also unfair to criticize the EU’s slowness in taking decisions, as coordination among
its  members and institutions necessarily  requires  time.94 To pretend that  there has
been  a  successful  Europeanization  of  all  national  foreign  policies  is  to  ignore  the
complexities of the question.95 To claim that a supranational EU would not have such
problems may be theoretically correct, but it is unlikely to become a reality in the near
future.96 Nor does it take into consideration the fact that it is possible for a united actor
to rush into a mistaken decision or not to be able to produce a coherent policy either.
66 Thus, although it is ironic that this is taken from a critic of the EU in Libya, Anand
Menon explains this point quite well:
Reasonable ambitions are the best starting point. It is unlikely that the EU will ever
become the kind of high-profile and effective international security actor that some
seem to think it should be. To assume that a Union comprising so many different
states with so many different preferences and interests could easily assume control
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of a mission the size of the involvement in Libya is to fundamentally misunderstand
the nature of this grouping of sovereign nation states. And it would be wrong to attribute
the blame to the Union itself. Rather, it is up to member states to step up to the plate
in  order  that,  collectively,  they  can  achieve  things  that  none  can  manage
individually. Debating institutions is all well and good. Yet this should not serve as
an alibi for member states that are responsible for the major failings of EU security
policies.97
67 Furthermore,  another  key  dimension  is  also  missed:  “military  power  is  not  the
centerpiece of the Union’s security policy” as Anand Menon correctly points out. It is
strange that this quote is also used in at least one critical assessment of the EU’s record
in  Libya  in  2011  or  that  the  very  author  of  this  quote  himself  provides  a  critical
assessment of the overall EU record in Libya.
68 It is also important to note that the existence of alternative institutional frameworks,
like  NATO or,  as  importantly,  the  continued  relevance  of  national  defence  policies
(especially for the big states), account in part for the EU not to have become a fully
fledged military actor. Something that some member states do not wish to see happen
and that most public opinions in Europe would not support probably. This is part of the
debate but it should not be limited to the Libyan case all the same. Especially when in
the  2011  crisis  in  Libya  it  was NATO  that  took  the  lead  under  American  military
command and then passed it on to the British and the French, still under the NATO
umbrella.
69 No military expert denies that the US role was vital: initial Cruise and other bombings,
and continued intelligence support, and, in the final phase of the war, the use of drones
which combined with British and French attack helicopters targeted bombings to bring
it to a successful end.98 The key argument for this article is that the USA played a key
role but not an exclusive one. To claim that there was no EU military action as such
amounts to a faux débat because there could not be such action in the first place as the
EU does not possess the necessary tools to do so. It also minimizes the role that EU
member states did play in the military field individually or collectively through NATO.
70 Finally, one should mention that by blaming the EU for so-called double standards with
non-democratic regimes, it is somehow implied that there can be no relations at all
with them. Bomb them or ignore them seems to the motto. This is far too simplistic and
naïve. The “stuff” of IR is –unfortunately– made of this type of dilemmas about how to
deal with those regimes for democratic countries and groupings. To engage or not to
engage also depends on circumstances, provided the objective remains the same: to
find a way to promote democracy and human rights even, in fact, especially, in adverse
circumstances.  Otherwise,  what  is  the  point  of  being  a  democracy?  This  is  a  key
dimension that most studies fail to address: to claim that Europe’s realpolitik had turned
a blind eye to human rights abuse and lack of democracy99,  favouring stability over
democracy, does not take into consideration short-term, medium-term and long-term
objectives  –nor  specific  circumstances  of  any  given  case,  and  of  course  wider
considerations such as what particular international system are we describing: a Cold
War situation, an immediate post-Cold War one, a post-2001 context, or at long last one
where populations can fight for their freedom without fear of escalation. The literature
on democratization is full of references to the need for revolution from within as a
prerequisite  for  a  truthful  democratization  process  (a  necessary  but  not  sufficient
condition).  As  for  the  external  role,  it  uses  various  forms  and  means,  including
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engagement when it is seen as appropriate or necessary, sometimes including direct or
indirect support for military struggle.
71 At the time of finishing the writing of this study (January 2014),  the 32nd EU-Russia
Summit was taking place in Brussels. The media reproduced pictures of Vladimir Putin
flanked by  the  respective  presidents  of  the  European Council  and of  the  European
Commission.  Another  news  notice  showed  pictures  of  the  respective  presidents  of
Argentina and of Brazil with Fidel Castro. More news referred to the US President’s
announcement that he would veto any US Congress extension of sanctions against Iran.
I just quote these examples to show how complicated it is to deal with non-democratic
regimes  and  how  policies  can  (and  should)  change  over  time.  This  should  not
necessarily be seen as double standards or considered as incoherence.
 
Conclusions
72 The conclusions of  this  study on how the EU reacted to the violent collapse of  the
Gaddafi regime in Libya are therefore contradicting what has been said to date: it is
clearly not such a poor record after all. There were no “Europe’s double standards over
Libya”.  Evidence  to  that  effect  was  provided  fully  and  several  assumptions,  often
bordering  on  wishful  thinking,  were  dismissed.  The  article  criticized  the  use  (and
abuse) of early studies100 that did not take into account the benefit of hindsight (even
publishing before the fall of the dictator), but also their ignorance of well-known facts
about the Gaddafi regime and its difficult relations with EU states and institutions.
73 We  do not  pretend  that  the  EU  reaction  cannot  be  criticized  of  course.  But  it  is
important  to  object  to  those  claims.  In  spite  of  divisions  (in  particular:  German
abstention at UN SC), the EU acted united over time and some member states even
participated militarily (through NATO) in the campaign to oust Libya’s Gaddafi under
R2P. Any different assessment fails to take into consideration the existing imitations of
means and instruments at EU disposal. They also do not take into consideration much
less successful EU reactions in the past. This article however has gone one step beyond
by adding the role of the EP, a dimension often ignored in those criticisms.
74 From this study it becomes clear that the harsh criticisms leveled at the EU over Libya
are widely unfair, unwarranted, inaccurate and incorrect. A more nuanced approach
would have been closer to reality. Such a view can also be found in other studies, which
yet remains a small minority.101 Similarly, Javier Valenzuela asserted that Europe got a
“pass”  over  Libya,  unlike  its  earlier  reactions  to  the  other  Arab  revolutions102;
therefore,  implying  a  “learning  curve”  among EU institutions  and  states.  It  is  also
important to note that we have also seen that even critics of the EU reaction often
qualify substantially their own assessments but without concluding in the same line as
this study all the same: for instance, Fabbrini points out that “[d]espite deep divisions,
EU  foreign  ministers  endorsed  ongoing  air  strikes  against  Libya  at  their  monthly
meeting on 21 March […]”.103
75 Finally, there is no guarantee of success for the Arab Spring. But this is not a reason for
blaming the EU states and institutions. In addition to qualifying substantially the rather
harsh  and  underserved  broad  criticism  of  the  EU  over  Libya,  this  study  has  also
presented  evidence  that  shows  that  the  EP  acted  as  a  prime  mover  for  stronger
international  and  European  responses  to  the  atrocities  perpetrated  by  the  Gaddafi
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regime  in  2011  –in  particular  by  contributing  actively  and  positively  to  a  wider
acceptance of a still emerging R2P concept.
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ABSTRACTS
The existing literature has been rather critical of the way the EU has reacted to the conflict in
Libya.  It  has  even  argued  that  it  represented  yet  another  example  of  EU  incoherence  and
inconsistency. This article qualifies substantially those criticisms by providing evidence to the
contrary: first, by using the “time factor”, it argues that first impressions are often misleading,
and that most criticisms based on earlier studies had been published even before the fall  of
Gaddafi; moreover, only focusing on a few years before the 2011 conflict,  they were taking a
“selective memory” approach, conveniently forgetting about the role of Libya as a “pariah state”
in the international  community.  Second,  the article  substantiates  with evidence how the EU
reaction was much more coherent and consistent than suggested. It also points out that at the
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end of the day, even Italy (special relationship with Gaddafi) participated in the bombing and
eventually Germany (abstention at the UN) closed ranks. It also adds further data by presenting
the  impact  of  one  of  the  most  long-standing  anti-Gaddafi  institutions: that  of  the  European
Parliament which spurred the Union into promoting a practical implementation of the concept of
Responsibility to Protect. Thirdly, the article also criticizes the rather unrealistic views taken by
many  an  observer,  in  particular  those  who  presume  of  the  existence  of  European  and
International Governance systems that simply do not reflect reality. Thus, the conclusion is that
initial  harsh criticisms should be somehow qualified,  especially if  one takes into account the
learning curve that EU foreign policy appears to show, when its reaction to Libya is compared to
those of the Balkans in the 1990s or to the Iraq war in 2003.
La littérature récente a été plutôt critique à propos de la manière dont l’Union européenne a
réagi  au  conflit  en  Syrie.  Il  a  même  été  avancé  qu’elle  représentait  un  autre  exemple  de
l’incohérence et de l’inconsistance de l’Union européenne. Cet article prend le contre-pied de ces
critiques.  Tout  d’abord,  en  faisant  appel  au  « facteur  temps »,  il  soutient  que  les  premières
impressions sont souvent source d’égarement, et que la plupart des critiques sont fondées sur des
études anciennes publiées avant la chute de Kadhafi. De plus, en se concentrant sur les dernières
années qui précédèrent le conflit de 2011, elles font preuve d’une mémoire sélective, oubliant
opportunément le rôle de la Libye comme « État paria » au sein de la communauté internationale.
Puis, cet article analyse les preuves d’une réaction européenne plus cohérente et consistante que
ses détracteurs ne l’ont soutenu. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: Libye, Parlement européen, La responsabilité protectrice, Union européenne
Keywords: EU, Libya, European Parliament, Responsibility to Protect
AUTHOR
STELIOS STAVRIDIS
Stelios Stavridis est chercheur senior ARAID au sein du groupe de recherches « Estudios Europeos
e Internacionales » de l’Université Saragosse. Il est l’auteur de nombreux articles parmi lesquels :
« Responsibility to Protect : what role for parliamentary diplomacy ? », ReShape Online Papers
Series, Paper no 02/13, Università di Catania, March, 23 p., ISSN 2281-910X : http://
www.fscpo.unict.it/EUROPA/JMAP/repaper2.pdf. dr.stelios.stavridis@gmail.com
“EU incoherence and inconsistency over Libya”: evidence to the contrary
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 89 | 2014
21
